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Abstract
Background The absence of census data on religious identification in Nigeria since 
1963 leaves much uncertainty about the most basic religious composition of the 
country. It is generally accepted that identification with traditional worship declined 
over the middle of the twentieth century as identification with Islam and Christian-
ity increased, leaving these the two dominant religious groups in the country. The 
current relative proportions of Christians and Muslims has often been the subject of 
conjecture, guesswork and assertion, as have trajectories of growth or decline.
Purpose Where researchers have used sound data to address this question, they have 
often drawn on a single survey, or, if on multiple data sources, it is unclear how 
the different estimates the data provides are reconciled. This paper seeks to address 
these gaps to construct a better picture of the religious composition of Nigeria, and 
to consider the trajectory of change.
Methods This study presents data from 11 nationally representative surveys of 
adults conducted between 1990 and 2018. Surveys include four waves of the World 
Values Survey, five waves of the Afrobarometer survey, The Pew Tolerance and 
Tension survey, and the Nigerian General Household Survey of 2010.
Results The results show that identification with Christianity is likely to have been 
the majority among Nigerian adults through this period. Evidence suggests that 
identification with Christianity was still growing in the first half of the 1990s, to 
a high point of 69% of the adult population. This growth was associated with the 
tail of the decline of identification with traditional worship. Thereafter identifica-
tion with Christianity has declined in proportional terms as identification with Islam 
has increased. Evidence is consistent with literature that suggests that this change is 
driven by differences in fertility, rather than by religious identity switching.
Conclusion and Implications Trends presented suggest that the Muslim-identified 
population is likely on track to have become an absolute majority of Nigerian adults, 
possibly within a decade with widespread implications, including for electoral 
politics.
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
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Introduction
Statistics about the relative proportion of those identifying as Christian or Mus-
lim in Nigeria are deeply contentious, as Afe Adogame explains:
In the past, the politicisation of the census on religious and ethnic grounds 
resulted in unreliable religio-ethnic demographic data in Nigeria, as popula-
tion statistics were (and still are) often manipulated for political, economic, 
and religious ends, not least because such figures constitute one basis for the 
sharing of national revenue and other resources. That partly explains why 
religious indices were excluded from the recent national census (2010: 479).
As a consequence of the lack of census data on religious identification in 
recent years, and the contested figures for the past, ‘accurate statistics for each 
tradition are difficult to come by and are largely a matter of conjecture’ (Adogame 
2010: 479), and one does find references to dubious sources.
In the past decade, there have been a number of serious attempts to move 
beyond pure conjecture, though agreement is limited and the guesswork abides. 
Most of the serious contributions, however, tend to each rely on a single data 
source, and the results do not always agree. By contrast, those assessments that 
make use of multiple sources of data, such as the World Christian Database 
(WCD), have not tended to make their calculations publicly transparent, nor 
clarified how they have squared the differences between contrasting indicators. 
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to see in the range of stated assessments any 
real debate about the relative proportions of Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, 
despite abiding disagreements.
What is known is that Christians (predominantly in the South) and Muslims 
(predominantly in the North) form the two largest blocks of religious identities in 
Nigeria. A substantial body of literature documents, and tries to explain the growth 
of identification with these two traditions over the course of the twentieth century, 
which has come at the expense of identification with traditional worship (Horton 
1971; Peel 2016). The decline of those identifying as ‘pagans’ in the colonial census 
is part of a long term trend, from 50% in the 1931 census, 34% in 1952, and 18.2% 
in the first census of independent Nigeria in 1963. Over the same time period, iden-
tification with Christianity and Islam has grown. Those identifying as Muslim in 
the census increased from 44 to 47% and those identifying as Christian from 6.2% 
to 34.6% (Ibrahim 1991: 116). While the census takings of the period have been far 
from uncontentious (Aluko 1965; Ahonsi 1988), the wide painted lines of that pic-
ture of religious change through the middle of the twentieth century is recognisable 
(Horton 1971; Peel 2016). There is a marked increase in identification with Christi-
anity and Islam, though many traditional beliefs and practices continue among those 
who identify as Christians or as Muslims. It is therefore right to be cautious about 
describing the change straightforwardly as mass conversion (Ibrahim 1991; Gif-
ford 2015). Even if there is broad agreement to this point, there is widespread disa-
greement about the proportions of the two largest groups, and about the continuing 
trends since the middle of the twentieth century.
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Figures in the most recent edition of The World Christian Encyclopedia (John-
son and Zurlo 2020) draw on figures assembled and updated as part of the World 
Christian Database (WCD); these put those who identify as Christians on 46.3%, 
and Muslims on 46.2 and ‘ethnic religions’ on 7.2%. WCD figures predict that 
both Muslism and Christians will continue to grow as a proportion of the popula-
tion through to 2050. Their projections predict Christians at that point will make 
up on 48% of the population and Muslims on 48.7%, both growing at the expense 
of ethnic religions, down to 2.9% of the population. The editors of the World 
Christian Encyclopedia provide reasonable methodological reflections on the dif-
ferent sources upon which scholars may draw in order to estimate the different 
religious populations of the world, as well as some of the issues that crop up as 
one tries to reconcile sources that disagree (Johnson and Zurlo 2020: 897–914). 
None of the particular calculations are provided, nor is there any accounting for 
methodological decisions in any particular case; neither transparency nor rep-
licability are in evidence, which makes social scientific evaluation of how they 
reached their conclusions impossible.
Hsu et al (2008) found that the WCD makes estimates that are broadly consistent 
with other data sources, they also note that the Database does seem to overestimate 
the Christian identification, and expressed concern about what appears to be uncriti-
cal acceptance of figures provided by religious groups of their membership. With 
reference to one denomination in Nigeria McKinnon (2020) has recently found evi-
dence that supports the criticisms offered by Hsu et al (2008). WCD estimates for 
Anglican identification in Nigeria were found to be dramatically over-estimated due 
to The Church of Nigeria’s un-evidenced membership claims.
The Pew Research Center project on the changing global religious landscape 
has also considered Nigeria (Hackett et al 2015). Using estimates derived from the 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 2008, adjusted to account for under-
represented groups (77), they put Christians on 49.3% of the population and Mus-
lims on 48.8% of the population, with 0.4% unaffiliated and 1.4% “folk religion” 
(47). How adjustments were made for under-represented groups is not made clear. 
While the DHS is a very high quality data source, the DHS Survey of 2008 has a 
greater proportion of Christians than any other recent DHS survey of Nigeria, with 
53.6% Christians in the sample. This is a considerably higher than the next highest 
proportion of Christians in the immediately preceding DHS survey of 2003 which 
had 47.9% Christians, and stands out even more in contrast to other years: 1990 had 
47.6% Christian, and subsequent years have also contained fewer Christians: 2013 
had 46.8% and 2018 had 46% Christians (all figures using standard weighting; Boyle 
et al 2019).
The Pew Research Center’s previous study of Islam and Christianity in sub-Saha-
ran Africa (Lugo and Coopermans 2010) estimated that the proportion of adults who 
identify as Christian (46%) was lower than that of adults who identify as Muslims; 
these had an absolute majority (52%, margin of error: 4%). A very important con-
tribution of the study is that the Tolerance and Tension survey found no evidence 
that religious change in Nigeria is shaped by conversion between Islam and Chris-
tianity (in either direction). The same percentage report being raised as Christian or 
Muslim as identify with the tradition now. This leaves differential rates of natural 
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population increase to shape the changing religious landscape in the country, what-
ever the current proportions of Christians and Muslims.
Stonawski et  al (2016) accept the 2012 Pew Research Center estimates for the 
relative population of Muslims and Christians in Nigeria, but give much stronger 
evidence that religious change is being driven by relative rates of natural increase. 
Also using DHS data, they demonstrate the impact of diverging total fertility rates 
(TFR), highlighting the difference between Muslims living in Northern states where 
Sharia law was introduced in 1999–2000 and Christians living in the South. (Mus-
lims living in the South share a pattern much closer to their Christian neighbours). 
Stonawski et al. have shown that, at the time of the 2008 DHS survey, the TFR for 
Christians living in the South (where most Christians live), had fallen from to 6.0 
in 1990 to 4.5 in 2013; in the same period, the TFR of Muslims in Sharia law states 
has increased from 6.4 to 7.2. Given that natural increase is the primary driver of 
religious change in Nigeria, this is predicted to slowly tip the balance decisively 
between the two largest religious groups, with Muslims achieving a majority, though 
much will depend on the precise TFR and any subsequent changes to fertility rates 
(see also Hackett et al 2015).
Data and Methods
This paper considers results from eleven high-quality Nigerian general population 
social surveys that contain questions on religious identity, analysing them to see 
what can be inferred in terms of the most likely relative proportion of Christians 
and Muslims in Nigeria, as well as any change that can be discerned over time. The 
survey results considered here are: (1) rounds three to seven of the Afrobarometer 
survey programme (2005, 2008, 2013, 2016 and 2018); (2) World Values Survey 
(WVS) waves two to four and six (1990, 1995, 2000, 2012; Nigeria did not partici-
pate in wave five); (3) the General Household Survey (GHS), a collaborative project 
of The Nigerian Bureau of Statistics and the World Bank, 2010) and (4), the Pew 
Research Center’s Islam and Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa survey (2008).1
The Afrobarometer survey programme is coordinated by three core partners, 
Michigan State University, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, and the 
Centre for Democratic Development in Ghana, and has now conducted six rounds of 
a multi-country survey of African nations, beginning in 1999–2001 (Afrobarometer 
2018). The World Values Survey is a well-known international non-profit associa-
tion, and one of the largest producers of social survey data globally (Inglehart et al. 
2014). The General Household Survey is a joint project of the Nigerian Bureau of 
Statistics with the Federal Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development and the 
World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study. The Pew Research Centre is a 
1 This paper does not analyse the only other relevant high-quality data source, the Demographic and 
Health Survey (DHS) because of the difficulty of making direct comparison with the data here. This is 
due to the DHS’s very different sampling frame: 15–49 year olds; women are oversampled, and one of 
the DHS surveys of this period only samples women.
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non-partisan think tank, a subsidiary of the Pew Charitable Trusts, with a commit-
ment to high standards in research methods (Lugo and Cooperman 2010). All four 
survey programmes are collaborations between national and international partners, 
and this reduces the likelihood data collection becoming distorted by political pres-
sures and inclinations.
In each of the eleven surveys, a nationally representative sample of the population 
is produced using a multi-stage stratified random sample with randomized selection 
at each stage. For the Afrobarometer and the World Values survey, each round draws 
an independent sample from a new sampling frame. In the World Values survey, 
a quota system is employed for the gender of the respondent within the sampled 
household. The General Household survey samples households, rather than individ-
uals, though person weights make necessary adjustments for the analysis of individ-
uals. In all the surveys, in country weights make small adjustments based on known 
characteristics of the national population.
In all of the surveys, fieldworkers conducted face-to-face surveys with non-insti-
tutionalised respondents. In all but the GHS, the individuals enumerated are all over 
the age of 18; the GHS collects data on all members of the sampled household, irre-
spective of age. In the main analysis presented here, only those who are over 18 are 
selected from the GHS survey for purposes of comparability. Useful indication of 
future change can be gleaned, however, from the subsequent consideration of what 
the results look like when complete households, including children, are enumer-
ated. Unlike in Europe or North America, where the majority of the population are 
over 18, the age structure of sub-Saharan Africa means that half the population are 
excluded from surveys of the adult population.2 The individual sample sizes of each 
of the surveys, response rates, and confidence intervals for proportions are reported 
in the Appendix.
In addition to random error, non-random distortions are also likely to have made 
an impact on all of these samples, despite the careful sampling strategy and the best 
efforts of researchers and fieldworkers. Some non-random distortion is probably 
inevitable even under ideal conditions; sub-Saharan Africa in general, and Nigeria 
in particular, does not provide ideal conditions. The challenges posed by poor and 
uneven infrastructure and rapid population growth in the country, as in the region as 
a whole, are enormous, and the different sampling strategies to deal with this com-
plexity undoubtedly result in non-random variation between surveys. It is probably 
not much comfort to scholars interested in religious demography, but these chal-
lenges plague all attempts by states, international organizations and NGOs across 
the region to gather even the most basic social and economic statistics, such as pop-
ulation, exports, imports, unemployment, GDP, or even a reasonably accurate count 
of the total population (Jerven 2013).
The religious identification questions in the Afrobarometer, World Values Sur-
veys and in the Pew Research Center Survey are asked differently. The Afroba-
rometer survey instrument instructs the interviewer to ask “What is your religion, 
2 The median age in Nigeria was 17.4 in 1990 and rising to just under 18 in the period considered here 
(UN Development Programme 2019).
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if any?” and to code from a list. The General Household Survey asks about each 
member of the household, “What is [name’s] main religion?”, recognising the pos-
sibility of multiple identifications and restricting it to the primary identity. The Pew 
Research Center survey by contrast uses a two-step process, whereby, respondents 
are asked “What is your present religion, if any?” Those who answer that they are 
Christian, are then asked what “denomination or church, if any, [they] identify with 
most closely.” The survey instrument was originally designed to collect primary and 
secondary identifications as well, but as very few respondents provided secondary 
identifications the secondary question was dropped across all of the national sur-
veys. As we are only interested in the relative size of populations identifying with 
Christianity, Islam and traditional religion, setting aside the considerable variation 
within each, the different question wordings should make no appreciable difference. 
This is particularly the case as non-identification with a religious tradition is very 
low in all of the surveys.
Results
Looking at Table 1, it is clear that the vast majority of the adult population identi-
fies with Christianity or Islam, and very few with traditional religion or no religion 
(here merged). This finding is unlikely to be controversial, given the longstanding 
recognition of mass adoption of Christianity and Islam over the course of the twen-
tieth century, even if the reasons for this massive shift have long been debated (Hor-
ton 1971; Peel 2016), and are arguably still not well understood. Barring the results 
from the 2012 World Values Survey, those who do not identify as Christian or Mus-
lim have amounted to no more than 4% combined any year since 1990. In the 2012 
survey, most of the responses in this category mostly (9%) consists of ‘no religion’, 
and traditional worship only 2%. There has been no substantial change to question 
wording that would boost ‘no religion’ responses, and this is much more substantial 
increase than we would expect given the confidence interval for the sample. Never-
theless, the proportion of no religion responses seems unlikely as a reflection of true 
value in the population, given that this would be difficult to square with responses to 
the religion question in the other representative samples; the reason for the anomaly 
is unknown. The decline in identification with traditional worship between 1990 and 
1995 is likely the tail end of the descent of identification with traditional religion 
that began in the middle of the twentieth century.
We can be sure that that neither Muslim nor Christian identities have been mak-
ing substantial gains in over the past 20 years by converting from among those who 
hold other religious identities or none. There are very few remaining (in proportional 
terms) others who could be won over to identify with either monotheistic tradition.
Looking over the two other categories, the first thing to notice is that Muslims 
form a majority in only one of the ten samples: in the 2008 Pew Research Center 
study the absolute majority identify as Muslim (52%) and 43% identify as Chris-
tian, and this stands out from all the rest of the samples in this respect. One would 
have to say that on the evidence of the ten other surveys, coming from three differ-
ent research groups, it seems highly unlikely that those who identify as Muslims 
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constituted the largest religious group of adult Nigerians between 1990 and 2018. 
Those identifying as Christian are not in the absolute majority only in the Pew 
(2008) and in the World Values 6 (2012) sample, though in the latter they still con-
stitute the largest group. In World Values 6, those with Christian identities are not an 
absolute majority again only because of the anomalous large number of respondents 
in the other/none category.
Looking at Fig. 1, there is a clear trend of steady growth from 25% identifying as 
Muslim towards 50% of the adult population of the country. While Christian identi-
ties increased between 1990 and 1995, mirrored by the decline in traditional wor-
ship, this appears to be the tail end of proportional growth of Christian identities 
before the trend starts reversing itself, not because of losses through conversion, but 
rather because the Muslim-identified population is growing faster. Those who iden-
tify as Muslim are growing towards 50% of the population, and those who identify 
as Christian are shrinking proportionately, towards 50% of the population.
Discussion and Limitations
The evidence presented here suggests that while those who identify as Christians 
have been the majority in Nigeria, Christians seem unlikely to maintain their place 
as the largest religious group in Nigeria for long. The change is demographic, rather 
than the product of conversions and defections, as the literature provides clear evi-
dence that switching between Christianity and Islam is not a substantial factor in the 
changing religious composition of Nigeria (Lugo and Cooperman 2010; Stonawski 
et al 2016; see also Zurlo 2017).
Stonawski et al. put considerable emphasis on the consequences of Sharia law in 
Northern provinces (inaugurated in 1999 and 2000) for the higher levels of fertility 



































Fig. 1  Religious identification, adult population Nigeria
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only includes those over 18, meaning that those born concurrently with the imple-
mentation of Sharia law will only be entering their 18th year in 2018 (and thus 
meet the inclusion criteria for the samples considered here), thus, the growth of 
identification with Islam presented here predates that development. These results 
reinforce the suggestion that the effects of inauguration of Sharia law in Northern 
Nigeria may be compounding change that was already under way, and may result 
in a much faster than expected rate of change. While it is conceivable that North-
ern Nigeria could undergo a similar demographic transition as has occurred in the 
predominantly Christian south, much seems likely to depend on women’s access to 
education, as well as birth control. Strong religious and cultural feelings directed 
towards all things perceived to be ‘western’ in the North, there seems likely to be 
some resistance to both women’s access to education and to birth control (Stonawski 
et al 2016).
One of the surveys considered here, the General Household Survey (2010) gives 
clear indication of the religious change that follows from the differential rates of fer-
tility. Table 1 and Fig. 1 reported the data selecting for individuals 18 years of age or 
older for purposes of comparison with the other general population surveys. In the 
GHS survey, 56% of those 18 years of age or over identify as Christians, and 42% 
of these identify as Muslim (Table 1). The children in the GHS sample, however, 
are more likely to be Muslim than the adults; if the children in those households 
are included, those identified as Christian drop to 52% of the total population, those 
identified as Muslim rise to 47% and the remainder fall to 1% (data from the Min-
nesota Population Center, 2019; standard person weights applied). Bearing in mind 
that switching between these identities is limited and has little net effect, the crosso-
ver point at which those adults who identify as Muslims will constitute a majority 
in Nigeria is closer than would appear from the adult data, as the greater number 
of Muslim children grow into adulthood (at present half of those children will have 
entered adulthood).
While the surveys presented here provide the best available evidence for the rela-
tive proportion of those Nigerian adults who identify as Muslim or as Christians, 
the samples do have a number of limitations. First, much about the population of 
Nigeria is unknown and subject to sophisticated guesswork, including the total pop-
ulation of the country. This means that sampling decisions made in a multi-stage 
cluster analysis (and the weights used to correct population estimates) are subject 
to uncertainties, even as the results presented here do show remarkable consistency. 
If a census of the population could ask the question about religious identification 
without being drawn into the politics of representation (and the funding implica-
tions that follow), this would be a much better source of knowledge on this question. 
That seems unlikely to happen any time soon, however. Further, while all of the 
samples use multi-stage cluster sampling, the relevant information to calculate con-
fidence intervals from complex samples is not made publicly available (and may, for 
some of the samples analysed here, be unknown). Thus, the confidence intervals for 
proportions presented in the Appendix (which assume a simple random sample) are 
likely to be overly optimistic. Finally, some of the response rates for the surveys used 
here (Appendix) are unknown, and for those that are known, there is little informa-
tion about how those response rates are calculated. There is not enough information 
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about response rates to speculate what the effect differential non-response between 
religious groups might be. These qualifications suggest the need for more and better 
information from survey researchers than is generally provided, particularly in the 
complex and challenging sampling environments of sub-Saharan Africa.
Conclusion and Implications
The results presented here, drawing on eleven high-quality general social surveys in 
Nigeria with questions on religion, provide evidence of a majority of adults hold-
ing Christian identities in the period 1990–2018. The surveys presented also offer 
evidence that Christians are in proportional decline and unlikely to maintain their 
majority position (in either absolute or relative terms) for long. Evidence suggests 
that growth in Christian identities between 1990 and 1995 is associated with the 
final tail of the decline of traditional worship and adoption of Christian identities, 
which grew to 69% of the adult population. The subsequent proportional decline of 
Christian identities appears to be a product not of Nigerians adopting Muslim identi-
ties, but of a greater growth of Muslim identified populations by natural increase. 
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